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Abstract 
 
 
Rather than renouncing empire after the fall of Napoleon, the article argues, French 
liberal thinkers expressed a sustained preference for a strategy based on 
transnational connections or what imperial historians describe as informal 
imperialism. The eulogy of European Christian civilization exemplified by François 
Guizot’s lecture at the Sorbonne in 1828 served not only to legitimize French global 
ambitions, but also to facilitate cooperation with other European imperial powers, 
especially Britain, and indigenous collaborators. Liberal enthusiasm for the spread 
of Western civilization also inspired the emergence of a French version of free trade 
imperialism, of which the economist Michel Chevalier proved a consistent advocate. 
Only when such aspirations were frustrated did liberals reluctantly endorse colonial 
conquest, on an exceptional basis in Algeria after 1840 and on a global scale after 
1870. The allegedly abrupt liberal conversion to empire in the nineteenth century 
may instead be construed as a tactical shift from informal to formal dominance.     
 3 
 Historians of modern ideas of empire have focused their attention on the 
desirability and legitimacy of territorial empires. The debate about European 
liberalism and imperialism in the nineteenth century is a case in point, giving pride 
of place, for example, to the justification of British rule in India by John Stuart Mill 
and of the French conquest of Algeria by Alexis de Tocqueville.1 Yet since John 
Gallagher and Ronald Robinson’s article on the ‘imperialism of free trade’ in 1953, 
historians of empire have had to contend with the hypothesis that territorial 
conquest was but one manifestation – perhaps not the most significant – of 
European expansionism and that imperial domination could be ‘informal’ as well as 
‘formal’.2 Even when modern practitioners of imperial and world history criticize 
                                                        
* Thanks are due to Jeremy Adelman, Christophe Charle, Richard Drayton, Emma Rothschild, Edward 
Shawcross and the anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions on earlier 
versions of this article. Translations of quotations originally in French are my own, although I have 
consulted and often followed contemporary translations when they were available. 
1 Jennifer Pitts, “Political Theory of Empire and Imperialism”, Annual Review of Political Science, 13 
(2010), 211-35. On the debate about liberalism and imperialism, see Andrew Sartori, “The British 
Empire and its Liberal Mission”, Journal of Modern History, 78 (2006), 623-42, and Duncan Bell, 
“Empire and Imperialism”, in Gareth Stedman Jones and Gregory Claeys, eds, The Cambridge History 
of Nineteenth-Century Political Thought (Cambridge, 2011), 864-92; key works include Uday Singh 
Mehta, Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought (Chicago, 1999); 
Sankar Muthu, Enlightenment Against Empire (Princeton, 2003); and Jennifer Pitts, A Turn to Empire: 
the Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France (Princeton, 2005). 
2 John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, “The Imperialism of Free Trade”, Economic History Review, 2nd 
ser., 6 (1953), 1-15; see also William Roger Louis, ed., Imperialism: the Robinson and Gallagher 
Controversy (New York, 1976). 
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the theoretical vagueness of ‘informal empire’, they insist that the study of Europe’s 
imperial domination needs to extend beyond territories placed under formal 
European sovereignty.3 To reflect this concern, this article argues, historians of 
ideas about empire ought to examine contemporary projects of informal or 
transnational domination. Such an approach makes it possible to advance an 
alternative interpretation to the alleged ‘liberal turn to empire’ in the mid-
nineteenth century as a more modest tactical shift from informal to formal 
dominance.  
Due to the collapse of the Bourbon and Napoleonic territorial empires 
between 1763 and 1815, reinventing global expansion as a trans-European and 
informal endeavour had extraordinary appeal in nineteenth-century France. Liberal 
intellectuals under the Restoration and July Monarchy continued to believe in the 
value of extending the reach of French power throughout the non-European world. 
Only rarely, however, did this belief lead to projects of territorial expansion: the 
conquest of Algeria was viewed as an exception rather than as the first building 
block of a vast territorial empire. This liberal preference for informal empire 
survived the fall of the constitutional monarchy and was adopted enthusiastically by 
                                                        
3 John Darwin, “Imperialism and the Victorians: The Dynamics of Territorial Expansion”, English 
Historical Review, 447 (1997), 614-42; Ann Laura Stoler, “On Degrees of Imperial Sovereignty”, Public 
Culture, 18 (2006), 125-46; Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, Empires in World History: Power and 
the Politics of Difference (Princeton, 2010), esp. 11-17.  
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the Second Napoleonic Empire, a regime that pursued a policy of global 
interventionism while eschewing large territorial annexations.4  
The liberal belief in the possibility of empire without annexation was 
predicated on the inherent seductiveness of European moral and economic 
civilization, of which France allegedly offered the finest specimen. Three core 
elements of this belief may together be said to constitute a preference for informal 
empire. First came a reconceptualization of the relationship between civilization 
and Christianity. While Enlightenment apologists of civilization had often 
considered Christianity with suspicion or hostility, liberal thinkers from François-
René de Chateaubriand to François Guizot placed a new emphasis on the civilizing 
virtues of Christianity and proclaimed the superiority of European Christian 
civilization over other stagnant or retrograde civilizations. A second element was 
the special status of France and Britain as the natural leaders of this vibrant 
Christian civilization, who should collaborate to ensure its global dissemination, by 
persuasion if possible and by forceful means if necessary. Historians have often 
neglected the intensity of the French liberal elite’s belief in the merits of an Anglo-
French global partnership because the exuberant Anglophobic rhetoric of the far left 
and the far right has attracted more attention. But the liberal intellectuals and 
statesmen who shaped French policy, from Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand and 
Guizot to Alphonse de Lamartine and Michel Chevalier, were stalwart defenders of 
                                                        
4 David Todd, “A French Imperial Meridian, 1814-1870”, Past and Present, 210 (2011), 155-86; on the 
significance of collaboration between European imperial powers, see Richard Drayton, “Masked 
Condominia: Pan-European Collaboration in the History of Imperialism”(forthcoming, 2013).  
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the Entente Cordiale. The third element was the surprisingly broad endorsement of 
a French version of ‘free trade imperialism’. For all their frequently noted 
reservations about laissez-faire economics within France, French economists could 
be as enthusiastic as their British counterparts about the removal of obstacles to 
Western economic expansion and the founding of settler colonies outside Europe.      
The intellectual origins of France’s second colonial empire after 1870 
therefore lay in a tactical transition from transnational to territorial expansion 
rather than in the abrupt conversion of the liberal intelligentsia to imperialism. 
Contrary to what Raoul Girardet, an eminent historian of ideas but also a 
disillusioned partisan of French Algeria until 1962, claimed in L’Idée Coloniale en 
France (1972), the project of a new colonial empire did not emerge out of an 
intellectual climate of liberal ‘indifference’ and ‘disdain’ for ‘overseas ventures’.5 
Liberal opposition to territorial aggrandizement cannot be equated with anti-
imperialism, because it was almost always combined with enthusiastic support for 
more economical forms of asymmetrical relationships with the extra-European 
world: these ranged from participation in the exploitation of territories under 
British rule, to pan-European protectorates over vast areas of the globe, to the 
promotion of a specifically French economic and cultural suzerainty over certain 
countries. Moreover, only in civilized Europe did French liberals categorically rule 
out an aggressive extension of French sovereignty. In the rest of the world, informal 
dominance was preferred. Yet when the appeal of French civilization did not suffice 
to restore France’s imperial status, most liberals proved willing to endorse 
                                                        
5 Raoul Girardet, L’Idée coloniale en France de 1871 à 1962, (Paris, 2005), 23. 
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annexation, exceptionally in Algeria after 1840 and more durably on a global scale 
after 1870.  
 
I 
 
The concept of civilization, refashioned by early nineteenth-century French 
intellectuals, facilitated the formulation of transnational projects of empire. When it 
was coined in the second half of the eighteenth century, the word civilisation was 
used always in the singular and served primarily as a tool of philosophical and 
historical analysis to highlight human accomplishments in a wide array of cultural 
contexts, in the vein of Voltaire’s Essai sur les Moeurs (1756).6 After 1815, civilisation 
became a hierarchical concept, often used in the plural to distinguish between 
Europe’s progressive civilization and that of others, which were described as 
stagnant or retrograde.7 The new usage went together with a reappraisal of 
Christianity’s role in the moral and material progress of Europe and a stress on the 
more perfect version of civilization achieved by France.  
                                                        
6 Marcello Verga, “European Civilization and the ‘Emulation of the Nations’: Histories of Europe from 
the Enlightenment to Guizot”, History of European Ideas, 34 (2008), 353-60; Pierre Force, “Voltaire 
and the Necessity of Modern History”, Modern Intellectual History, 6 (2009), 457-84. 
7 Reuel Lochore, History of the Idea of Civilization in France, 1830-1870 (Bonn, 1935), 9-17; Brett 
Bowden, The Empire of Civilization: the Evolution of an Imperial Idea (Chicago, 2009), 23-46; see also 
special issue on ‘Civilisations. Retour sur le mot et les idées’, Revue de Synthèse, 129 (2008); on ideas 
of European identity, see Anthony Pagden, ed., The Idea of Europe: from Antiquity to the European 
Union (Cambridge, 2002).  
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The Histoire des Deux Indes, the multi-authored best seller of pre-
revolutionary Europe edited by Abbé Raynal, may paradoxically be viewed as laying 
the foundation of this discourse. The work’s moving condemnation of the atrocities 
committed by Europeans outside their continent and its scathing critique, drawn 
from Physiocratic theory, of the mercantile policies that underpinned the colonial 
system, are well known.8 But it is also remarkable for its pan-European treatment of 
colonial expansion since the fifteenth century: specific colonies or national empires 
are usually dealt with in separate sections, but the results of each nation’s colonial 
ventures are compared and ranked from the worst (the Portuguese and the 
Spanish) to the least bad (the British). Some sections, such as book eleven on African 
slavery, dealt with ‘European’ overseas activities, and the overall impression left by 
the work of colonization as a collective endeavour by Western, Atlantic European 
states.9 Furthermore, as several analyses pointed out, even the most critical 
passages, authored by Denis Diderot, left open the possibility of more benevolent 
sorts of colonization: Britain’s more enlightened colonial policies, especially the self-
                                                        
8 Anthony Pagden, Lords of all the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France c. 1500-c. 
1850 (New Haven, 1995); 156-77; Muthu, Enlightenment, 72-121; Pernille Røge, “Political Economy 
and the Reinvention of France's Colonial System, 1756-1802” (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of 
Cambridge, 2010), ch. 2; on the early implementation of these ideas, see Emma Rothschild, “A 
Horrible Tragedy in the French Atlantic”, Past and Present, 192 (2006), 67-108, and François-Joseph 
Ruggiu, “India and the Reshaping of French Colonial Policy (1759-1789)”, Itinerario, 35 (2011), 25-
43.  
9 Guillaume Thomas Raynal, Histoire philosophique et politique des établissements et du commerce des 
Européens dans les deux Indes, 5 vols (Geneva, 1780), III, 91-236. 
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government granted to European settlements in North America, were held out as a 
possible model for future colonial ventures, despite the condemnation of British 
resistance to the independence of the Thirteen Colonies in the third edition of the 
work in 1780.10 
Such support for the independence of European settlements should not be 
interpreted as hostility to all forms of imperial ventures, but only as the 
condemnation of European domination over other Europeans. This became clear in 
French commentaries on the independence of American colonies in the next 
decades. The views of Talleyrand, a major influence on French foreign policy in this 
era, are characteristic. While in exile in the United States in 1795, the former bishop 
of Autun observed that despite the destruction of the ‘links between subject and 
sovereign’, ‘interests’ as well as ‘habits’ (language, laws, tastes) ‘made of each 
American an Englishman, and made him tributary to England with a compelling 
force, which no declaration or recognition of independence could overcome’. Thanks 
to independence, Britain enjoyed all the benefits of a highly profitable and rapidly 
expanding market, and no longer bore the costs of defending it.11 After Talleyrand 
returned to France, his Essai sur les avantages à retirer de colonies nouvelles (1797) 
described the independence of all colonies in the Americas as ‘inevitable’ and 
recommended the foundation of new French colonies in Asia or Africa. But he 
insisted that such colonies should enjoy a complete freedom of government, on the 
                                                        
10 Denis Diderot, Political Writings (Cambridge, 1992), 198-204.   
11 “Lettre de Talleyrand à Lord Landsdowne”, 1 Feb. 1795, repr. in Michel Poniatowski, Talleyrand 
aux Etats-Unis, 1794-1796 (Paris, 1967), 345-59.  
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model of the ‘independent’ colonies of Ancient Greece. The benefits of the new 
colonization would accrue from ‘the powerful tie of a common origin’: ‘At a great 
distance, every other relation becomes in time illusory.’12 In a work of propaganda 
commissioned by Napoleon, De l’Etat de la France en l’An VIII (1800) a close 
collaborator of Talleyrand, Alexandre d’Hauterive, would elaborate upon the 
possibility of using language and habits rather than territorial acquisitions as 
privileged means of spreading French influence across Europe and the globe.13 
The Abbé de Pradt, a prolific publicist who also worked with Talleyrand, was 
more specifically concerned with French influence overseas. He concurred that the 
independence of European colonies in the Americas was inevitable and even 
desirable, because ‘self-government’ would increase their prosperity and capacity to 
consume European goods: the aim of colonies was ‘to draw a profit’ and whether 
such profit derived ‘from sovereignty or commerce [did] not matter’. Pradt only 
made an exception for Caribbean colonies, because once independent their 
predominantly African populations were more likely to become pirates than 
steadfast consumers of European products. To maintain the European character of 
the other colonies, Pradt recommended the continuation of emigration to the 
Americas and the foundation of new schools to educate the new countries’ elites. 
Such institutions, which might be established in the disused Catholic monasteries of 
the French Atlantic coast, would constitute ‘enduring bonds between France and all 
                                                        
12 Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord, Essai sur les avantages à retirer de colonies nouvelles, dans 
les circonstances présentes (London, 1808), 42-3.  
13 Emma Rothschild, “Language and Empire, c. 1800”, Historical Research, 78 (2005), 208-29. 
 11 
the known colonies’.14 What mattered to Pradt as well as Talleyrand was the 
preservation of superior European – if possible French – values, languages, habits 
and tastes rather than political dominion.  
The growth of Pan-European or Eurocentric ideas facilitated this 
disconnection of the benefits of overseas expansion from sovereignty. The rise of 
Eurocentrism in the late eighteenth century has sometimes been associated with the 
messianic overtones of the radical Enlightenment and French Revolution. Comte 
Volney’s writings are often noted for their unflattering descriptions of Islam as well 
as their influence on Napoleon’s Egyptian expedition of 1798. Volney’s prediction 
that the Ottoman Empire would soon crumble certainly helped to nurture French 
projects in the Middle East during the Revolution.15 The first recorded usage of 
‘Occident’ in the sense of Western Europe and its overseas offshoots can be found in 
Condorcet’s Esquisse d’un tableau historique des progrès de l’esprit humain (1795), a 
work which also called for the foundation of new ‘colonies of citizens’ in Africa and 
Asia.16 But the Eurocentrism of radical philosophes remained tempered by their 
hostility to Christianity. In his rêverie on the regeneration of mankind, the Ruines, ou 
méditations sur les révolutions des empires (1792), Volney, for instance, disparaged 
                                                        
14 Dominique de Pradt, Les Trois âges des colonies, ou de leur état passé, présent et à venir, 2 vols 
(Paris, 1801-1802), II, 132-3, 160-4, 529-32; see also Dominique de Pradt, Des colonies, et de la 
révolution actuelle de l’Amérique (Paris, 1817). 
15 “Le Siècle des Lumières face à l’Empire Ottoman”, in Henry Laurens, Orientales, 3 vols (Paris, 
2007), I, 57-85, at 59-60. 
16 “Histoire, anthropologie et politique au siècle des Lumières, le cas de l’orientalisme islamisant”, in 
Laurens, Orientales, I, 15-29, at 16; Pitts, A Turn to Empire, 168-73. 
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equally all the world’s religious and political dogmas. In such works, the superiority 
of French civilization appeared recent and, to a large extent, contingent. 
By contrast, the reappraisal of Christianity and the new emphasis placed by 
some authors on its essential contribution to the progress of civilization after 1800 
helped to harden the sense of European and French superiority over the rest of the 
world. A highly influential work in this respect was François-René de 
Chateaubriand’s Génie du Christianisme (1802), which defended Christianity in 
general and Catholicism in particular, against the attacks of the philosophes, as the 
main source of European material and moral improvement: ‘In every country, 
civilization has invariably followed the introduction of the gospel. The reverse is the 
case with the religions of Mohammed, Brama and Confucius, which have limited the 
progress of society and forced man to grow old while yet in his infancy.’ A 
prominent example in the book of the civilizing influence of Catholicism around the 
globe was that of the missions, which fostered the progress of ‘arts, sciences and 
commerce’ in the Levant, America, India and China.17 In the Itinéraire de Paris à 
Jerusalem (1811), Chateaubriand, while lamenting the degeneration of the East as a 
result of Muslim superstition and tyranny, collected evidence of the civilizing 
influence of French crusaders and missionaries since the eleventh century.18  
The denigration of Turkish military despotism in the Itinéraire was also a 
veiled critique of the authoritarian and expansionist turn taken by the Napoleonic 
regime. Talleyrand, Hauterive, Pradt, Volney and Chateaubriand were all initially 
                                                        
17 François-René de Chateaubriand, Génie du Christianisme, 2 vols (Paris, 1966), II, 138, 214. 
18 François-René de Chateaubriand, Itinéraire de Paris à Jérusalem (Paris, 2005), 337-48, 373-8. 
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supporters of Napoleon, before breaking with him at various stages between 1803 
and 1812: they favoured the expansion of French power, but not under the form of 
military conquest. The Napoleonic occupation of foreign territories might have 
accentuated the cultural arrogance of France’s administrative elite and fostered the 
growth of a more ethnic conception of civilization.19 But the collapse of the 
Napoleonic regime was hailed by most liberal intellectuals, including Benjamin 
Constant in the Esprit de conquête (1814), as a triumph of commercial civilization. It 
was to consolidate the permanent victory of commerce over war, Pradt commented 
on Constant’s pamphlet, that Europe now needed to extend commercial 
opportunities and ‘carry civilization to all the places which it has not yet reached’.20 
It was under the Bourbon Restoration of 1814-1830 that a new meaning of 
civilisation emerged, referring to a specific cultural system anchored in a religious 
tradition.21 In a series of lectures delivered at the Sorbonne in 1826, Théodore 
Jouffroy, the translator of Thomas Reid and Dugald Stewart, discerned three 
‘systems of civilization’, which dominated the globe apart from the regions still 
peopled by ‘savages’: Christianity, Islam and Brahmanism, the latter term 
encompassing Chinese and Japanese as well as Indian culture. Jouffroy was a sceptic, 
but religion, he argued, did not only lead to the emergence of  ‘a form of worship’, 
                                                        
19 Stuart Woolf, “French Civilization and Ethnicity in the Napoleonic Empire”, Past and Present, 124 
(1989), 96-120.  
20 Dominique de Pradt, Du congrès de Vienne (Paris, 1816), 35-6, 242-5. 
21 Lucien Febvre, “Civilisation: évolution d’un mot et d’un groupe d’idées”, in Lucien Febvre et al., 
Civilisation: le mot et l’idée (Paris, 1930), 10-59. 
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but also of ‘a specific civil order, specific politics and specific customs’. ‘In a word’, 
he concluded, ‘every religion gives birth to a civilization.’ Christian civilization was 
‘the truest, and as a result the most powerful’, and would eventually ‘absorb the 
other two’. Three nations stood ‘at the head’ of Christian civilization: Germany, 
specialized in science; England, specialized in the practical use of knowledge; and 
France, specialized in philosophy. But France, being more scientific than England 
and more practical than Germany, also held the most eminent role of this ‘majestic 
and holy’ alliance, that of ‘pivot of civilization’. European statesmen, he concluded, 
should henceforth abandon the ‘narrow ideas of patriotism’ and work for ‘the 
civilization of the world by the unity and ideas of Europe’.22 
The Eurocentric reconciliation of the Enlightenment discourse of civilization 
with Christianity reached a climax in another set of lectures given at the Sorbonne 
two years later by François Guizot.23 These lectures are better known for the 
intellectual enthusiasm they elicited at the time and their influence on the thought 
of Alexis de Tocqueville, Karl Marx and John Stuart Mill.24 But they also proclaimed 
the superiority of ‘European and Christian civilization’ over ‘the other civilizations 
                                                        
22 Théodore Jouffroy, “De l’état actuel de l’humanité”, in Mélanges philosophiques, 2nd edn (Paris, 
1838), 92-133, at 97, 102, 120-1, 129. 
23 On Guizot’s significance in the history of French liberalism, see Pierre Rosanvallon, Le Moment 
Guizot (Paris, 1985) and Michael Drolet, “Carrying the Banner of the Bourgeoisie: Democracy, Self 
and the Philosophical Foundations to François Guizot’s Historical and Political Thought”, History of 
Political Thought, 32 (2011), 645-90. 
24 Larry Siedentop, “Introduction”, in François Guizot, The History of Civilization in Europe (London, 
1997), vii-xxxvii. 
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which have developed themselves in the world’. Ancient civilizations, Guizot argued, 
were prone to rapid decline (Greece) or stagnation (Egypt, India) because they 
tended to rely on a single ‘social principle’, whereas the diversity of Christian 
Europe engendered continuous dynamism. Similarly, ‘Immobility [was now] the 
characteristic of moral life’ for ‘most of the populations of Asia’. As for the Arabs, 
‘tyranny’ was ‘inherent in [their] civilization’, as a result of the Muslim ‘confusion of 
moral and material authority’.25 In a second series of lectures the following year, 
Guizot claimed, in the manner of Jouffroy, that France held a special place in 
European civilization. Britain excelled at ‘material progress’ and Germany at 
‘intellectual progress’, but France excelled at combining both harmoniously: ‘her 
civilization has reproduced more faithfully than any other the general type and 
fundamental idea of civilization. It is the most complete, the most veritable, and, so 
to speak, the most civilized of civilizations.’26 
 
II 
 
Even when they described France as the most perfect exemplar of European 
civilization, French advocates of informal empire acknowledged Britain’s 
extraordinary contribution to the progress of mankind and its diffusion around the 
globe. After the Napoleonic Wars, they also became keenly aware of Britain’s 
hegemony outside Europe. To help France recover its rank and participate in the 
                                                        
25 François Guizot, Histoire de la civilisation en Europe (Paris, 1985), 61, 74-6, 103. 
26 François Guizot, Histoire de la civilisation en France, 2nd edn, 4 vols (Paris, 1840), I, 8-12, 21. 
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global expansion of European civilization, they therefore argued for a policy of 
cooperation with its traditional rival.  
As early as 1801, Pradt had argued that the French should celebrate rather 
than lament British expansion in India, because Britain’s conquests were ‘more 
common than particular, more European than English’ and would eventually benefit 
all European countries.27 In 1814, Henri de Saint-Simon proposed the merging of 
Britain and France into a single state, in order to preserve European peace and 
enable France to access British markets: ‘The empire of the sea will also be France’s 
and extend [its] commerce, increase [its] industry.’28 The near coincidence of the 
Revolution of 1830 and British electoral Reform stoked hopes that a progressive 
‘Entente Cordiale’, an expression first recorded in 1828, would facilitate the 
resurgence of French influence overseas.29 After the overthrow of the Bourbons in 
1830, cooperation with Britain and the prevention of a revolutionary war became 
the official policy of the July Monarchy of 1830-1848. In his Mémoires, Guizot, one of 
the new regime’s leading political figures, described the taming of France’s 
‘posthumous passion for adventure and conquest’ in Europe as its main foreign 
policy objective, combined with the ‘formation of a public, European and Christian 
                                                        
27 Pradt, Trois âges, 452 ; emphasis in the original text.  
28 Henri de Saint-Simon and Augustin Thierry, De la Réorganisation de la société européenne, repr. In 
Pierre Musso, ed., Le Saint-Simonisme, L’Europe et la Méditerranée (Houilles, 2008), 64. 
29 Raymond Guyot, La Première Entente Cordiale (Paris, 1926); Roger Bullen, Palmerston, Guizot and 
the Collapse of the Entente Cordiale (London, 1974), 1-24.  
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law’ in cooperation with Britain.30 But hostility to conquest did not imply the 
abolition of military coercion. In an explanation of France’s intervention in the Papal 
States in 1832, Guizot argued that even within Europe, civilized powers had a duty 
to intervene when governments flouted the fundamental standards of ‘modern 
civilization’: ‘There is a level of bad government which nations, whether great or 
small, educated or ignorant, will not, in these days, endure.’31  
Michel Chevalier, young graduate of the Ecole Polytechnique and editor of 
the Saint-Simonian periodical, Le Globe, wholeheartedly supported the new regime’s 
foreign policy.32 While the conflicts of the past eight hundred years were almost all 
due to the rivalry between Britain and France, he argued, the triumph of progressive 
forces in the two countries rendered possible a ‘close political alliance’, dedicated to 
the material and moral improvement of the world.33 But the eradication of war in 
Europe would increase instead of eliminate the need for ‘intervention’ beyond 
national borders, because progress required and entailed ‘a continuous exchange of 
sentiments, ideas and material products between nations’ and ‘from this triple 
current which always ebbs and flows, waxing and waning without end, there results 
an unremitting intervention between man and man, city and city, nation and nation, 
                                                        
30 François Guizot, Mémoires pour servir à l’histoire de mon temps, 8 vols (Paris, 1858-67), IV, 3-5.  
31 Guizot, Mémoires, II, 292. 
32 Jean Walch, Michel Chevalier, économiste saint-simonien (Paris, 1975); Michael Drolet, “Industry, 
Class and Society: a Historiographic Reinterpretation of Michel Chevalier”, English Historical Review, 
123 (2008), 1229-71.  
33 “Loi des 80,000 hommes. La France et l’Angleterre”, Le Globe, 8 Dec. 1830; repr. in Politique 
européenne (Paris, 1831). 
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continent and continent’.  In this conception of progress as the result of constant 
interactions, France had a special role to play, because it was ‘the Coryphaeus that 
precedes and leads the multitude’. After Greece and Rome, it was destined to pursue 
‘the mission of civilizing peoples’.34  
Chevalier outlined how Europeans, at peace among themselves, should now 
export material and moral improvement to ‘the entire world’, and more particularly 
south and east of the Mediterranean, because ‘Christian nations are not the only 
ones that crave for progress today’. His training as an engineer made Chevalier an 
early believer in the power of new transport technologies to increase Europe’s 
capacity to transform the rest of the world. Five years before the opening of France’s 
first railway line, he expounded the project of a vast network of railways and steam 
navigation, centred on Europe but reaching deep into Africa and Asia. The network 
could be completed, he believed, in fifteen years and at the relatively reasonable 
cost of eighteen billion francs. Distances would shrink: a traveller, ‘starting from Le 
Havre in the early morning, will be able to have lunch in Paris, supper in Lyon and 
catch, on the same evening in Toulon, a steamship bound for Algiers or Alexandria’. 
Parallel networks of telegraphic lines and banks would further increase interactions 
between nations and continents. This acceleration of the movement of individuals, 
ideas and commodities would alter ‘the constitution of the world’: ‘what is today a 
vast nation will be an averagely sized province’. Thanks to its geographical position, 
between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, France would amply benefit from this 
revolution, but England, ‘the queen of industry’, would retain its essential role: ‘The 
                                                        
34 “L’intervention”, Le Globe, 17 Dec. 1830; repr. in Politique européenne. 
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railway from Le Havre to Marseille will serve as a bridge for the passage of powerful 
Albion, its engineers and its treasures.’35  
Chevalier remained vague about the political consequences of these imminent 
transformations, perhaps because of the Saint-Simonian scorn for traditional 
diplomacy. Alphonse de Lamartine, a liberal royalist and future republican, who 
held some sympathies for Saint-Simonian ideas, gave a possible interpretation on 
his return from a journey across Greece, Turkey and Syria in 1832-3. In his maiden 
speech at the chamber of deputies, he confirmed Chateaubriand’s diagnosis that the 
decay of the Ottoman Empire was irreversible and called for an active regeneration 
of the region by European powers: ‘a general and collective protectorate of the West 
upon the East’ should form the basis of a new ‘system’ of ‘public law’. Provinces of 
the Ottoman empire would then be handed over as ‘partial protectorates’ to the 
major European powers: the Balkans to Austria, Asia Minor to Russia, Syria to 
France, and Egypt to Britain. Yet the rights of European powers would be limited: 
each would only enjoy ‘partial sovereignty’, freedom of religion would be 
guaranteed, and in the eventuality of a war in Europe, these protectorates would be 
treated as neutral territories. Such European protection over the East would not be 
based on ‘the right of might and conquest’, but on ‘the right of civilization’ (droit de 
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civilisation).36 The accomplishment of his programme, Lamartine insisted, should 
rely on a solid alliance between Britain and France, ‘the two powers which have 
initiated every progress in the world’.37  
The new transnational thinking about the expansion of Europe was sometimes 
grounded in racial distinctions, which drew connections between national groups as 
often as they set up barriers between others. Yet ‘race’ remained a fluid concept, 
which combined, in various proportions, cultural and biological considerations.38 In 
Chevalier’s Lettres sur l’Amérique du Nord (1836), for example, race served as a 
loose synonym for civilisation or referred to combinations and subdivisions of 
civilizations. The product of a two-year journey in the United States, Canada, Mexico 
and Cuba, the Lettres were a study of European efforts to colonize and improve the 
New World.39 Alexander von Humboldt hailed the work as a ‘treatise of the 
civilisation of the peoples of the West’.40 This study, the introduction explained, 
intended to throw up useful lessons in view of the imminent assertion of Western 
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civilization’s dominance over Eastern civilization, ‘the greatest event in the history 
of man’. In addition to the East and the West, Chevalier described ‘the Arab race’ as 
an ‘intermediate civilization’, which might serve Europe as ‘a powerful ally in its 
efforts to seize and hold Asia, or to transmit to [Asia] the means of working out its 
own regeneration’.41  
Chevalier also subdivided European civilization into three ‘races’: ‘Latin’, 
‘Teutonic’, and ‘Slavic’, corresponding respectively with the Catholic, Protestant and 
Orthodox branches of Christianity. His main concern, at this crucial juncture in 
world history, was the declining contribution of the Latin race to Western 
expansion, by comparison with the dynamism of the Teutonic Anglo-Americans and 
Slavic Russians. France should therefore aim to redress the balance in favour of its 
own group. It was ‘the head of the Latin group’ and ‘its protector’: ‘to [France] it 
belongs to rouse [Latin nations] from the lethargy into which they are plunged in 
both hemispheres … and to enable them again to take a stand in the world.’ The 
expeditions of Egypt and Algiers suggested that France was, in addition, destined ‘to 
encourage the new spirit, which seems to be re-animating the Arabs, and through 
them to shake the East’. France’s mission of regeneration would be accomplished by 
‘education’ and local ‘intermediaries’, since Latin and Arab peoples would naturally 
welcome France’s benevolent protection.42 The Lettres sometimes expressed 
nostalgia about the territorial empire lost in 1763, especially the Saint-Lawrence 
and Mississippi valleys: ‘we were occupying the most fertile, best watered, and 
                                                        
41 Michel Chevalier, Lettres sur l’Amérique du Nord, 2 vols (Paris, 1836), I, viii. 
42 Chevalier, Lettres, I, x-xiv. 
 22 
finest portion of North America … there is left to us, alas! nought but vain and 
impotent regrets.’ But Chevalier recognized the superiority of the English over 
French settlers and argued that France’s defeat in the Seven Years War had 
accelerated the ‘progress of civilization’ in North America.43 French emigration, he 
suggested, served the cause of civilization better in independent states than in 
colonial dependencies. For instance, Chevalier was enthusiastic about the prospects 
of French immigration in Mexico.44  
Guizot, Lamartine and Chevalier therefore imagined a civilizing empire that 
would not rely on territorial expansion, but collaboration with an equally civilized 
partner (Britain) on the one hand and adherents of civilization in countries (Latin 
and Arab) who had a special affinity with France on the other. This was not an 
entirely fanciful project. In the 1830s, French influence, for example, seemed 
preponderant in Muhammad Ali’s Egypt. But the Eastern crisis of 1840 
demonstrated the limits of this strategy: the radical opposition of Britain to Egypt’s 
plans of territorial expansion at the expense of its Ottoman suzerain resulted in 
humiliation for Muhammad Ali and his French protectors.45 The crisis shook but did 
not alter the support of advocates of informal empire for cooperation with Britain. 
Guizot took the reins of a new ministry intent on preserving peace and repairing the 
damage done to the Anglo-French relationship. Rejecting calls for war to avenge 
French honour, he asserted: ‘France’s means of influence consist in … conquering 
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everywhere, not territories, but minds and souls.’46 The young Alexis de Tocqueville 
opposed Guizot’s policy of appeasement in 1840. But in later parliamentary debates 
about the suppression of the slave trade, he confessed that he shared the attraction 
to an ‘intimate and permanent union’ of Britain and France and ‘[t]he idea of these 
two great peoples, so great in mind, enveloping, in a way, the universe within their 
vast embrace, and forcing it to remain in repose and peace’.47  
 
III 
 
The project of French global expansion by informal means had an economic as well 
as a moral and intellectual dimension. Free trade imperialism, consisting in support 
for new settler colonies in allegedly virgin lands as well as for the forceful removal 
of obstacles to the circulation of Western capital and commodities elsewhere, has 
usually been associated with British economists such as Edward Gibbon Wakefield, 
Herman Merivale or John Stuart Mill.48 Yet since Turgot and Raynal, French 
economists had been sanguine about the advantages to be derived by the global 
intensification of commercial exchanges. After 1815, they also increasingly drew on 
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the notion of a superior European civilization to justify the coercive expansion of 
market institutions across the globe by Britain and France.  
The notion that before the 1870s French economists were consistently 
hostile to colonisation or empire remains widespread.49 A major source of confusion 
has been the radical critique of colonial trade restrictions or the exclusif by Jean-
Baptiste Say, a tutelary figure of nineteenth-century French economics. It is true that 
Say, drawing on the arguments of the Physiocrats and Adam Smith against 
mercantilist legislation, consistently defended the independence of European 
colonies in the Americas, from the first edition of his Traité d’économie politique 
(1803) onwards. But after 1820, he began to consider European expansion in Africa 
and Asia more favourably.50 In 1824, probably under the influence of James Mill’s 
History of British India, he defended British dominance in the sub-continent because 
‘the people of Asia’ did not ‘think it possible to live without a master’ and were 
better off under a British than an Asian despotic government. Modern Europeans, 
Say rejoiced, were ‘destined to subdue the world, as they [had] already subdued the 
two Americas’, but ‘by the inevitable ascendancy of knowledge, and the unceasing 
operation of [their] institutions’ rather than ‘by force of arms’.51  
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In a footnote to the 1826 edition of his Traité, Say even called for ‘the 
creation of independent states of European origin’ in North Africa: ‘the 
Mediterranean will be an immense lake, furrowed by the commerce of the wealthy 
nations, peopling its shores on every side.’ Offering further evidence that the liberal 
condemnation of territorial expansion did not apply to the extra-European world, 
Say described such colonies as an alternative to Napoleon’s ‘spirit of conquest and 
domination’: ‘The vast means at the disposal of Napoleon might have been 
successfully directed to this grand object, and he would now enjoy the reputation of 
having civilized, enriched and peopled the world, instead of having devastated it.’52 
Say’s support for settler colonies remained grounded in a desire to spread European 
civilization rather than to revive French formal power overseas: in his Cours 
complet, he insisted that Europeans of English descent were the best colonizers, 
whereas nations ‘distinguished by their social talents rather than by talents useful to 
society’, a transparent allusion to the French national character, were ‘not fit to 
found colonies’.53  
We do not know what Say, who died in 1832, thought of the 1830 expedition 
of Algiers. His successor as professor of political economy at the Collège de France, 
Pelegrino Rossi, only briefly alluded to the possibility of turning colonization in 
Africa into ‘a work of civilization’.54 But Say’s disciple and successor as professor at 
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the Conservatoire des Arts et Métiers, Adolphe Blanqui, was more explicit, becoming 
a staunch advocate of European supremacy in North Africa and free colonial trade. 
In his Histoire de l’économie politique (1837), Blanqui cited Say to condemn colonial 
rule as archaic and ineffectual: ‘it is not necessary to be master of a country in order 
to establish advantageous relations with it.’55 But the condemnation only applied to 
the old colonial system, not settler colonialism. In a report on the economic 
prospects of Algeria in 1840, when the French government embarked on a policy of 
full occupation, Blanqui welcomed the end of ‘forbearance’ for the indigenous 
populations: ‘We must provide for, or rather hasten the time when we can do 
without their assistance. Indeed, they are the only impediment to colonial 
development.’ Blanqui recommended ‘evicting’ most Muslims from the Algerian soil 
and adopting ‘the system of colonization by Europeans’. Citing as an example the 
repeal of colonial trade restrictions in British colonies, he also demanded the 
abolition of preferential tariffs in North Africa: ‘The freedom of trade should be, in 
my opinion, the most powerful auxiliary of colonization.’ 56  
Another figure frequently cited to illustrate the alleged hostility of French 
political economy to empire is Frédéric Bastiat, the utopian free trader who 
founded, in the wake of the British Anti-Corn Law League’s triumph in 1846, an 
Association pour la liberté des échanges. But Bastiat may be considered as France’s 
Richard Cobden, whose own radical anti-imperialism did not prevent other British 
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free traders from upholding a more assertive conception of free trade, compatible 
with the foundation of settler colonies and gunboat diplomacy.57 Futhermore, 
although Bastiat was unambiguously opposed to the colonization of Algeria, his 
criticisms focused on the inefficiency rather than the inequity of colonial rule. His 
ostensibly anti-colonial view that ‘A nation without possessions beyond its borders 
has got the entire world as its colonies’ could be interpreted as an endorsement of 
informal empire.58  
Bastiat’s efforts to spread the Cobdenite gospel of free trade in French public 
opinion floundered. 59 But it is significant that the handful of liberal intellectuals 
who expressed sympathy for his campaign included those interested in the global 
spread of French civilizing influence. Guizot and Lamartine, for example, were not 
well versed in economic theory. Yet both shared a sense that greater commercial 
openness would be beneficial to the promotion of French interests abroad. Guizot 
represented a protectionist constituency of linen producers in Normandy, Lisieux, 
and his conservative majority strongly inclined towards protectionism.  In this 
context, his moderate expression of support, in 1846, for commercial reform, was 
bold: ‘commercial freedom has salutary results; it encourages the multiplication of 
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relations between nations, and consolidates and prolongs general peace.’60 In 1847, 
Lamartine delivered a more effusive speech at a free trade meeting in Marseille. His 
conviction that tariff protection was the work of ‘a devil’, and free trade ‘the law of 
God’, was dictated by his ‘heart’ rather than the ‘algebra of political economy’. Free 
trade, he concluded his address to the local merchants, was the natural consequence 
of commercial expansion: ‘The sails of your ships, your mastheads, the fumes of 
your countless steamships, continuously write, on your clear sky and the waves of 
every sea, the triumphant dogma of free trade.’61  
Similarly, it was a desire to see France emulate British dynamism rather than 
a strict adhesion to Ricardian political economy which prompted Chevalier to 
embrace free trade in the mid-1840s. The ex-Saint-Simonian was not an orthodox 
defender of free market economics. Upon learning, in 1840, that Chevalier would 
succeed him at the Collège de France, Rossi allegedly quipped: ‘It will give him … an 
opportunity to learn political economy.’62 Chevalier’s lessons at the Collège retained 
a distinct Saint-Simonian flavour. His inaugural lecture redefined political economy 
as the science that should guide Europe’s ‘civilizing invasion’ of the rest of the world, 
while subsequent lectures insisted on the benefits of state intervention for the 
development of transport infrastructures, credit institutions and professional 
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education.63 Chevalier was also lukewarm about free trade. Having dismissed tariff 
questions, in the 1830s, as ‘really secondary’, he supported, in his lectures, a 
moderate relaxation of trade restrictions, but ‘without jeopardising national labour, 
which indeed deserves [the state’s] full protection’.64 Only in 1846 did the abolition 
of the British Corn Laws led him to describe France’s protectionist policy as an 
‘absurdity in the time we live in’, and he made a modest contribution to Bastiat’s 
campaign.65 
Chevalier’s adhesion to free trade was important because as economics 
editor of the main liberal daily, Le Journal des Débats, he was well placed to influence 
public opinion, and because as a close advisor of Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte after 
1852, he soon became able to implement his views. Chevalier’s support for Louis-
Napoléon’s coup of 1851 might cast doubt on his commitment to liberal political 
institutions. Yet a large number of British intellectuals with impeccable liberal 
credentials, including Thomas Macaulay and Walter Bagehot, also endorsed the 
Bonapartist regime as a necessary bulwark against anarchy and socialism, and 
mused that the French might be unfit for British-style parliamentary institutions.66 
Chevalier was if anything more optimistic about the prospects of political liberty in 
France. As Councillor of State after 1852 and Senator after 1860, he was noted for 
                                                        
63 Michel Chevalier, Cours d’économie politique, 3 vols (Paris, 1842-1850), I, 26 and II, 5. 
64 Chevalier, Lettres, I, 149-50; Chevalier, Cours, I, 224. 
65 Journal des Débats, 8 Apr. 1846; Deuxième séance publique de l’association pour la liberté des 
échanges (Paris, 1846), 9-13.  
66 Vincent Wright, Le Conseil d’État sous le Second Empire (Paris, 1972), 48, 118. 
 30 
his frequent defence of individual freedoms.67 Although he conceded that ‘Anglo-
Saxon’ peoples were probably more apt at ‘self-government’ than Latin ones, he 
warmly supported the parliamentary evolution of the Bonapartist regime after 
1860, arguing that only ‘Orientals’ would never be able to adopt ‘the representative 
system’. In ‘European and Western nations’, ‘personal government’ could only ever 
be a ‘temporary expedient’, while France in particular ought to restore 
parliamentary institutions because ‘peoples that want to preserve their influence 
and authority, not to fall and be considered among the states of the second or third 
order, are bound to adopt the representative system unreservedly’.68  
The same concern with the preservation of French authority and influence 
informed his support for economic reforms. Above all, he wished to ensure that 
France would supervise, alongside Britain, the on-going process of global economic 
integration – or what his biographer described, fifteen years before the coinage of 
globalisation and mondialisation, as the ‘planétarisation de l’économie’.69 After 
Bastiat’s death in 1850, he became the leading exponent of free trade south of the 
Channel. His observations on the 1851 universal exhibition in London highlighted 
the growing irrelevance of the national market for thinking about economic 
processes: ‘Here is some muslin that was perhaps woven in Saxony with yarns from 
Manchester spun from a mix of cotton from Surat in India, Mobile in the United 
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States, and Egypt; it is going to be embroidered in Nancy, before being sold in 
Philadelphia, or Canton, or Batavia, after having transited by the warehouses of New 
York, Hong Kong or Singapore.’ But the waning of economic borders did not abolish 
power politics. On the contrary, European states ought to emulate Britain’s adoption 
of free trade in order to face the intensification of ‘universal competition’. The 
French, the Germans and the Americans had no need to fear the superiority of 
British industry, because innovation, capital and entrepreneurs circulated freely 
across the ‘Western civilization’. By contrast, ‘Eastern’ and ‘Muslim’ civilizations 
were lagging behind and would be increasingly confined to the production of raw 
materials for Western industry.70 The decline of Eastern polities, Chevalier warned 
in a new edition of his Cours d’économie politque, derived from their lack of 
openness: ‘China shows, through the state of its industry no less than the state of its 
sciences, its arts, and its civil, political and military institutions, what is the fate of 
nations that isolate themselves.’71  
Chevalier’s views were in harmony with those of France’s new emperor. Louis-
Napoléon had redefined ‘Napoleonic ideas’ as the condemnation of continental or 
colonial conquests, combined with the active promotion of material and moral 
progress in France, Europe and the world.72 Hence his claim, in the speech 
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announcing his intention to restore the imperial regime in 1852, that ‘L’Empire, 
c’est la paix’ and that his ‘conquests’ would be moral and economic rather than 
territorial.73 Chevalier could fairly describe himself as the ‘architect’ of the regime’s 
economic policies.74 He negotiated the Anglo-French treaty of commerce of 23 
January 1860, which paved the way for a network of European and to some extent 
global system of bilateral free trade agreements.75 In 1861, Chevalier steered 
through the Senate the law that finally abolished France’s colonial exclusif.76 
Confirming his status as economic icon of Bonapartism, he headed the French 
delegation to the 1862 London universal exhibition and presided over the jury of 
the 1867 Paris universal exhibition.77 Yet the version of free trade propounded by 
Chevalier was compatible with the use of coercion, provided that it served the cause 
of Western industrial civilization. The regime’s propaganda drew extensively on his 
view of France as the protector of Catholicism, Latinity and free trade to justify its 
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military enterprises against Russia (1853), China (1856), Austria (1859) and in 
Syria (1860).78  
Chevalier’s strident advocacy of the attempt to create a French-protected 
Mexican monarchy in 1861-7 illustrates his complicity with the Bonapartist version 
of free trade imperialism.79 When Chevalier visited Mexico in 1835, he was 
impressed by its agricultural, mineral and commercial potential, and attributed the 
country’s economic stagnation to the misguided adoption of republican and federal 
institutions after its independence, whereas its predominantly Latin character 
required a unitary monarchy.80 Alarmed by the annexation of Texas in 1845 and 
further Mexican territory in 1848 by the United States, Chevalier denounced the 
‘spirit of conquest’ of the ‘Anglo-American Empire’ and accused French 
governments of having failed to fulfil France’s ‘mission’ of ‘protector of Catholic 
states and Latin nations’.81 His anxiety resonated with the fears of Guizot, who 
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sought in vain to preserve an independent Texas as a buffer against American 
territorial ambitions: ‘it is our interest that the Spanish race, the southern Catholic 
race, retains its importance, its strength in the new world, that it does not fall under 
the yoke of, and is not devoured by, the Anglo-American race’.’82 When the Second 
Empire seized upon Mexico’s default on its financial obligations to intervene 
militarily, Chevalier insisted in defence of the expedition that it aimed not at 
conquering the country, but at substituting ‘a perfectly independent and liberal 
monarchy’ for ‘a nominal and worthless republic’. The establishment of a 
progressive government that satisfied the Latin yearning for prestige and authority 
would turn Mexico, from ‘a nation useless to mankind’, into ‘a major state that 
counts in the balance of the world’.83 Although the French-backed government 
collapsed ignominiously in 1867, the venture sponsored by Chevalier can be seen as 
the hubristic apex of French aspirations to transnational empire.  
 
IV 
 
French advocates of informal empire usually made one important exception to their 
condemnation of conquest: Algeria, most of which was brought under direct French 
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rule, at a heavy human and material cost, between 1840 and 1848. But it is 
important to note that many contemporaries viewed Algeria precisely as an 
exception, justified by the failure of a policy based on more informal means of 
dominance, rather than as the prelude of a wider territorial empire in Africa. Initial 
French projects in Algeria did not significantly infringe on the principled rejection of 
conquest. Until the late 1830s, the July Monarchy only attempted to control major 
ports and a few surrounding areas for small-scale French settlements. The majority 
of the former Regency was left to govern itself and it was hoped that emulation of 
European settlers would lead to the gradual assimilation of indigenous populations 
to French civilization.84  
Even Benjamin Constant, the most eloquent critique of Napoleonic 
imperialism, might have supported such a scheme of colonization. Jennifer Pitts 
described Constant as a stalwart opponent of imperial expansion, both within and 
outside Europe. It is true that in the Esprit de conquête, Constant did not explicitly 
exclude the acquisition of extra-European territories from his denunciation, but nor 
did he explicitly include them. His use of expressions such as ‘the far ends of the 
earth’ does not guarantee what Pitts described as ‘the global scope’ of his critique, 
since when the pamphlet was written in 1813-14, such an image was as likely to 
evoke Napoleon’s Russian campaign as overseas conquests. As noted by Pitts, 
Constant shared the perception of Muslim Ottomans as ‘a horde of barbarians’ and 
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of their ‘stationary’ empire as ‘eclipsed by civilization’.85 The only short text that he 
wrote before his death on the expedition of Algiers, while wishing for the victory of 
French forces and refusing ‘to respect the quality of sovereignty in a barbarian’, the 
Dey of Algiers, castigated the expedition as a reactionary scheme to drum up 
patriotic feelings on the eve of a crucial general election. But Constant, after 
dismissing the quarrel between Charles X and the Dey as an ‘affaire d’honneur’, 
suggested that he would support the expedition if it led to the ‘colonization’ of the 
Regency: for it to become an ‘affaire nationale’, he contended, ‘an undisputed, 
indisputable colonization should be the prize of victory and the fruit of the sacrifices 
risked’ by the Bourbon regime.86   
The colonization that Constant had in mind resembled the ancient Greek 
system of small settlements, offered as a model for North Africa by a like-minded 
adversary of the Restoration, Jean-Charles Simonde de Sismondi.87 French publicists 
and politicians put forward a wide array of projects for the former Regency in the 
early 1830s, but the concept of small-scale European settlements peacefully 
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spreading the moral and material benefits of civilization was one of the most 
influential. Lamartine, among others, supported it. The poet-politician considered 
the capture of Algiers as ‘the most just conquest ever accomplished by a nation’ 
because it eradicated white slavery and piracy from North Africa. But in 1836, when 
the Governor of French possessions in North Africa, General Bertrand Clauzel, 
planned to extend effective French rule over the interior of the colony, he protested 
against a policy of ‘expropriation’ and ‘extermination’. Instead of colonization by 
French settlers over the entire territory, Lamartine defended a system of 
‘colonization by the natives’, under the mere ‘suzerainty’ of France.88 Similarly, 
Guizot denounced Clauzel’s policy as  ‘bellicose, jealous’ and overly concerned with 
extending  ‘official French domination’. Instead, Guizot advocated a policy of ‘limited 
occupation’, which consisted in ‘establishing ourselves firmly in specific regions 
rather than hastily proclaiming French sovereignty by force’ throughout the 
Regency. Guizot therefore warmly endorsed the Tafna treaty of May 1837, which 
recognized the emir Abd al-Qadir’s preeminence in western Algeria.89 
Yet after he came to power in 1840, Guizot presided over the expansion of 
effective French rule to nearly the entire Regency, condoning in the process the use 
of methods that violated the elementary conventions of jus in bello. In his Mémoires, 
Guizot was unapologetic, misleadingly describing himself as an unswerving 
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advocate of territorial conquest in Algeria.90 Guizot’s change of heart mirrored the 
evolution of Alexis de Tocqueville, from the latter’s defence of self-government for 
the territories under Abd al-Qadir’s influence in 1837 to his advocacy of the harsh 
repression of resistance to French rule in 1841.91 Two main factors account for the 
conversion of Guizot, Tocqueville and others to territorial conquest. Firstly, having 
taken advantage of the Tafna treaty to build up his fiscal and military resources, Abd 
al-Qadir broke the peace in 1839 and inflicted a series of major setbacks to his 
would-be suzerains: the lack of willing collaborators discredited the option of 
domination by intermediaries. Secondly, the decision to engage in a fully fledged 
war of conquest was almost certainly a reaction to the humiliation experienced by 
France during the Eastern crisis of 1840: hence Tocqueville’s insistence, in the 
opening lines of his 1841 essay, that the ‘abandonment’ of Algeria was impossible 
because it would reinforce the sense of French ‘decline’.92   
The Algerian exception, however, did not undermine liberal distrust of 
territorial conquest. Explaining his decision to block the projected conquest of 
Madagascar after 1840, Guizot cited the disasters of Louisiana, Canada and India as 
evidence that the French lacked the enterprising skills necessary for ‘large 
territorial and colonial settlements’. Not that France, he argued, should remain, 
‘absent and inactive around the globe’: on the contrary, ‘in every place where 
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European and Christian civilization is carried and spreads, France must play its part 
and spread its own genius’. But such a policy of global influence was better served 
by the acquisition of maritime stations or point d’appuis for the support of French 
commercial or missionary activities.93 Guizot’s government indeed acquired several 
new comptoirs in Africa and the Indian and Pacific Oceans. But even this form of 
expansion, Guizot argued in relation to Tahiti, should take the form of a 
‘protectorate’ rather than the extension of France’s ‘direct and complete 
sovereignty’.94  
Lamartine, too, retained profound misgivings about territorial expansion. In 
June 1846, he delivered an impassioned speech against French policy in North 
Africa since 1840. Paying homage to Edmund Burke’s critique of the British 
administration in India, Lamartine denounced the project ‘of governing this Arab 
nationality under conditions of direct, uniform, European rule’ as a chimera and the 
atrocities committed by the French army as a ‘system of extermination’. Yet the poet 
did not advocate Algerian independence. Instead, he recommended the replacement 
of military by more humane civilian authorities and a return to a system of 
government of indigenous populations based on ‘suzerainty’ rather than 
‘sovereignty’. Lamartine was hostile to territorial conquest but not to an active 
French policy in Muslim lands: on the same day, he delivered another speech, which 
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urged the government to defend more effectively the interests of Maronite 
Christians, ‘this seed of population and alliance’ for France, in Ottoman Syria.95  
It is even possible to view Amédée Desjobert, described as a ‘leftist’ and 
‘republican’ adversary of empire by Pitts, as another defender of the preference for 
informal empire.96 Desjobert was only a leftist in the sense that as a deputy under 
the July Monarchy he sat with Odilon Barrot’s very moderate Gauche dynastique. Nor 
was he a sincere republican after 1848, since he endorsed Louis-Napoléon’s coup of 
1851 and served as a Bonapartist deputy until his death in 1853. In his early works 
on Algeria, Desjobert did not advocate a full French withdrawal from North Africa. 
On the contrary, he recommended the continued occupation of several ‘points 
maritimes’, combined with a close alliance with Abd al-Qadir, whom he viewed as an 
agent of centralizing civilization. He also wished to surround Abd al-Qadir with 
French delegates, who, on the model of Muhammad Ali’s French advisors in Egypt, 
would help the Algerian leader turn his country into a ‘foyer de civilisation’, while 
scores of Algerians educated in France would return to North Africa as ‘civilizing 
missionaries’. Such a collaborative ‘Arab system’ of French domination in Algeria 
would, he concluded, strengthen France’s hand in Eastern affairs.97 Only after 1840, 
when the adoption of unrestrained violence by the French ruined the chances of a 
system based on cooperation, did Desjobert unreservedly advocate withdrawal, and 
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he did so on the grounds that occupation weakened French power and prestige as 
well as for humanitarian reasons.98 
Chevalier, for his part, expressed only limited interest in Algerian affairs. In 
1831, he advocated handing the new colony over to Britain on the grounds that the 
English were a better ‘colonizing people’ than the French.99 While travelling in 
North America, the sight of prosperous French Canadian settlements persuaded him 
that France should keep and colonize its North African possession.100 But his most 
significant contribution to debates about Algeria was his patronage of another ex-
Saint-Simonian, Ismayl (born Thomas) Urbain, a métis from Guyana who converted 
to Islam and rose to become the leader of the arabophile party in Algeria. Urbain 
wished to limit European immigration and protect indigenous land property. His 
ideas inspired the project of an ‘Arab Kingdom’, an attempt of the Bonapartist 
regime to reverse the policy of territorial conquest and propound instead the 
emergence of an autonomous Algeria under French protection.101 Chevalier 
supported the policy ‘wholeheartedly’.102 But the combined hostility of Republicans 
at home and settlers in Algeria, together with the turmoil caused by the great famine 
of 1866 in North Africa, derailed the project. In a different way from the disaster of 
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the Mexican expedition, the failure of the Arab Kingdom policy in Algeria seemed to 
indicate, by the late 1860s, the limits of French informal power overseas. 
. 
V 
 
The doubts elicited by Mexico and Algeria about the merits of a civilizing enterprise 
relying on influence and collaboration were compounded by the rapid rise of 
Prussian power on the European continent. The shocking defeat to Prussia in 1870 
accentuated the liberal crisis of self-confidence in the superiority of French 
civilization and its natural seductiveness. Liberal intellectuals gradually came to 
recognise the necessity of territorial annexations overseas as a means of 
perpetuating France’s civilizing mission. Ironically, it was Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, a 
former advocate of informal empire and Chevalier’s son-in-law, who rehabilitated 
territorial conquest and laid the foundations of the Third Republic’s colonial 
doctrine.  
After 1865, Chevalier himself began to fear that Prussia’s expansionist policy 
might lead to a new European ‘civil war’. He therefore called for the creation of a 
European ‘tutelary organization’, which would fix the principles of ‘European public 
law’ and prevent the eruption of new conflicts between nation-states.103 True to his 
principles, he was the only Senator who voted against the declaration of war on 
Prussia in July 1870. The fall of the Second Napoleonic Empire left him profoundly 
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disillusioned. He lost faith in international law as a means of regulating competition 
between European powers, attributing Europe’s regression to Britain’s failure to 
recognize its interest and cooperate with France to stop Prussian aggressions: 
‘France’s power succumbed at the great expense … of [Britain’s] own’, because 
toppling British hegemony would become the next objective of a united Germany. 
The blustering diplomacy of the United States suggested that international law did 
not ‘stand a better chance in the Western hemisphere than in ours’ and confirmed 
his fears about the global waning of European as well as French influence.104 
Concern over France’s decline was, if anything, more acute in the ranks of the 
liberal opposition to the late Bonapartist regime. The champion of representative 
institutions and acerbic critique of the Mexican enterprise, Anatole Prévost-Paradol, 
gave an apocalyptic description of France’s diminished global status in his 1868 
best-seller, La France nouvelle: the irresistible rise of Germany in Europe and 
dissemination of ‘Anglo-Saxons’ over the globe seemed to condemn France to 
déchéance. To reverse this trend, he argued, the acquisition of ‘trading posts’ was 
insufficient. Instead, France needed to augment its ‘material place’ and ‘physical 
strength’. Only an ‘increase in population’ and an ‘increase in territory’ could ensure 
that ‘the name French [will] still count for something’ in the future. France’s last 
chance, Prévost-Paradol argued, was Algeria, which could become the kernel of a 
‘Mediterranean empire’. The emergence of a veritable ‘African France’ required the 
removal of legal protections for indigenous Algerians to encourage European 
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immigration and further territorial expansion, beginning with Tunisia and Morocco. 
Only at this price could France avoid a destiny of ‘shameful insignificance’.105 
After the disasters of the Franco-Prussian War and the Commune, Ernest 
Renan, the liberal philologist, offered his own remedies to reverse France’s decline 
in La Réforme intellectuelle et morale (1872). This influential text included an 
apology of colonial conquest on the model of British India as ‘a necessity of the first 
order’: ‘While conquests between equal races ought to be condemned, the 
regeneration of inferior or bastardized races is part of the providential order of 
mankind.’ Renan’s exhortation was not devoid of civilizing undertones, but unlike 
earlier reflections on the superiority of European or Christian civilization, it held 
little prospect of universal fraternity. Instead, it described Europeans as ‘a race of 
masters and soldiers’, who ought to govern the Chinese ‘race of workers …  with 
justice’ and be ‘good and human’ with the African ‘race of land labourers’.106 
Prévost-Paradol and Renan’s strident calls for territorial expansion illustrate 
how the sense of decline at the turn of the 1870s called into question the project of 
informal empire. But the case of Paul Leroy-Beaulieu’s gradual rallying to colonial 
conquest is more important because it shows how even a former prominent 
advocate of informal expansion came to endorse the necessity of territorial 
conquest, suggesting that the turn to territorial empire was primarily grounded in 
tactical considerations rather than a profound shift in conceptions of development 
or perceptions of extra-European cultures. It is also significant because Leroy-
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Beaulieu is considered a major contributor to the colonial doctrine of the Third 
Republic. He acquired this status thanks to the success of De la colonisation chez les 
peuples modernes, the successive editions of which (in 1874, 1882, 1886, 1891, 1902 
and 1908) served as a reference for the emerging colonial studies of French 
academic institutions.107 However, the work was not, at least initially, a blueprint for 
the colonial programme of the Third Republic. Although the first edition was 
published four years after the fall of Napoleon III, the work was originally an essay 
written between 1866 and 1868 for a prize competition in political economy 
organized by the Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques. Leroy-Beaulieu was 
awarded the prize in March 1870, but the Franco-Prussian war and the subsequent 
political turmoil delayed its publication until 1874.108  
The original manuscript is unfortunately missing from the Académie’s 
archives. But it is likely that the text published in 1874 is essentially the text 
submitted before the competition ended on 31 December 1868, apart from the 
explicit addition of fifteen pages, out of nearly six hundred in total, on the 
development of Algeria after 1870: none of the facts and statistics elsewhere in the 
book refer to a later period and the Académie’s report on the submission suggests 
that Leroy-Beaulieu did not modify his views in the version published in 1874.109 
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This first edition was in fact still typical of the free trade imperialism of French 
economists before 1870, condemning mercantilist regulations but also territorial 
conquests, apart from the settler colonies of Britain (Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand, The Cape) and France (Algeria). Tellingly, Leroy-Beaulieu’s main patrons 
during his youth were Guizot, an acquaintance of Leroy-Beaulieu père, the mayor of 
Lisieux in Guizot’s parliamentary constituency, and Chevalier, whose daughter 
Cordelia Paul Leroy-Beaulieu married in May 1870. The most frequently cited 
authors in the 1874 edition were British advocates of free trade imperialism 
(Robert Torrens, Wakefield, Merivale) and Chevalier himself.  
The only suggestion, in the first edition of De la colonisation, that France 
should expand its colonial demesne is the conclusion of the passage added in 1874, 
in which he expressed the hope that ‘by joining Algeria to Senegal, we shall one day 
dominate and civilize all the north-west of Africa’.110 This reflected a reappraisal of 
territorial expansion, which Leroy-Beaulieu began to advocate in the press in 1873: 
‘in the future as in the past, the power and influence of a people will be 
proportionate to the quantity of territory it will be able to occupy, exploit, and 
civilize in countries that are now barbaric.’111 Leroy-Beaulieu remained hesitant in 
the following years, still expressing a preference, in 1879, for the colonization of 
Africa by a ‘moral and civilizing influence’ rather than by ‘conquest’. But after 1880, 
when he succeeded his deceased father-in-law as professor of political economy at 
the Collège de France and the formation of a more radical republican ministry made 
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him fear a bellicose policy of revanche against Germany, his support for colonial 
expansion became more consistent. Hence the numerous and substantial alterations 
to the second edition of De la colonisation in 1882, which described existing French 
colonies as ‘embryos of territorial empires’ and created, alongside commercial 
colonies and plantation colonies, the new category of ‘colonies of exploitation’, 
where capital instead of settlers would bring about material and moral 
improvement.112 Informal empire, after all, was not sufficient if France wished to 
retain its rank and propagate its civilization. 
 
 
 
Projects of transnational and informal empire were an important sequence in the 
history of European ideas about empire. Taking them into consideration helps to 
elucidate the conversion of many self-described progressive thinkers from the 
radical critique of the coercive methods of early modern empires in the eighteenth 
century, to a more or less qualified endorsement of the legitimacy of imperial 
conquest in the nineteenth century. A belief in the possibility of spreading European 
civilization by peaceful means frequently preceded a disillusioned recognition that 
such a project necessitated, in most cases, imperial rule. Liberal thinkers, from 
Constant to Leroy-Beaulieu, retained a steadfast preference for informal means of 
dominance as less costly and more humane. But except in the case of other civilized 
European countries, they rarely ruled out, in the last resort, conquest or 
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colonization. Rather than an abrupt change of heart, it was the sometimes limited 
success of attempts at informal dominance, new geopolitical circumstances, and the 
growing technological gap between Europe and the rest of the world, which led such 
thinkers to alter their calculation of the relative costs and benefits of colonial 
conquest. The frustration of aspirations to informal empire should be considered as 
a significant factor behind the rapid resurgence of support for territorial empire in 
the second half of the nineteenth century.  
But such an outcome was not inevitable and ideas about transnational and 
informal imperial projects in the mid-nineteenth century also need to be studied for 
their own sake. The contours of the informal empire conjured by French thinkers 
after the fall of Napoleon were not as precise as historians of ideas might wish: such 
vagueness was a direct consequence of rejecting the ostensibly neater politics of 
sovereignty in favour of various types of cultural and economic connections across 
national borders. In order to clarify the principles and mechanisms of French 
informal imperialism, it would be useful to study the reception and practical usage 
of such ideas by the agents of French informal expansion, for example France’s 
numerous diplomats, thanks to the rich records of the Archives du ministère des 
affaires étrangères. It would also be necessary to analyse how these ideas were 
received and often reinterpreted in other European countries and among 
collaborators of French informal imperialism, in particular in the regions redefined 
at the time by French diplomacy – in order to stress their cultural or geographical 
proximity to France and Western Europe – as Amérique Latine and Proche Orient.  
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Recognizing the significance of projects of transnational and informal 
empire may also encourage historians of French imperialism to offer a new account 
of the transition from the early modern Bourbon empire in the Americas to the 
modern Republican empire in Africa and Asia. French global ambitions between 
1815 and 1880 were neither suspended nor confined to Algeria. Instead, they 
privileged an informal economic and cultural approach, exemplified by a fivefold 
increase of commodity exports and twelvefold increase of capital exports between 
1840 and 1880, and by an active policy to consolidate the status of French as the 
lingua franca of high culture and civilization in eastern Europe, the Mediterranean 
and the Americas and to promote it in Asia and Africa. France’s informal empire 
was, to some extent, imagined, and it encountered several setbacks. But from a 
global perspective, it was a remarkably successful venture, which left as rich a 
legacy as the territorial empires of the Bourbons, Napoléon I or the Third Republic, 
and experimented with a type of imperial control often deployed by the 
superpowers of the twentieth century. 
 
 
 
